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Abstract
I derive a social planner’s optimal information design in an environment
with quasi-hyperbolic discounting consumers without commitment. Consump-
tion induces instantaneous utility, but unknown delayed cost. Consumers may
or may not acquire additional costless information on the cost parameter. The
planner’s optimal signal can be interpreted as an incentive compatible con-
sumption recommendation whenever the cost parameter is below some cut-off.
Welfare strictly exceeds the one under full information. I characterize distri-
butional conditions under which welfare attains first best.
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1 Introduction
Evidence suggests that many consumers have self-control problems (see e.g. DellaV-
igna (2009)): in order to receive instantaneous gratification from consumption, they
overconsume products which create long-term health risks. The finding that con-
sumers act against their own interest has led to various suggestions on possible pa-
ternalistic policies to help consumers make better choices: nudges in form of default
options (Thaler and Sunstein (2003)), optimal “sin-taxes” on unhealthy products
(O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006)), or simple prohibition of drugs as implemented in
most countries.
I analyze optimal information design by a social planner as an alternative form of
paternalism to induce consumption behavior that is (more) aligned with consumers’
long run interests.
I draw a connection between the dynamic consumption model with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting consumers by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and the optimal information
design approach by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and derive a consumer-optimal
information signal about the consumers’ risk type. The optimal signal consists of a
simple binary signal, which displays whether or not the risk is below some threshold.
There are numerous examples where institutions implicitly use cut-off signals
in form of recommendations, guidelines or definitions, when consumers themselves
fail to thoroughly interpret data. For instance, many governments have adopted
guidelines that define thresholds for responsible alcohol consumption (Kalinowski
and Humphreys (2016)). the world health organization (WHO) defines a body mass
index of 25kg/m2 as the cut-off point for overweight.1
Moreover, labels are a common tool to provide consumption recommendation on
the basis of thresholds. For instance, in 2006 the Food Standard Agency (FSA) in
the UK introduced a traffic light rating system for food nutrition values. Products
with sugar or saturated fats above certain thresholds are highlighted with a red light
to display the health risk of the product. Further, the organic food label by the
European Union defines minimum requirements for food to be labelled as organic.2
My paper provides a rationale for the use of these information policies, and
1http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/37003/1/WHO TRS 854.pdf
2(EG) Nr. 889/2008 and (EG) Nr. 834/2007
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shows how to choose the respective thresholds in order to induce the welfare max-
imizing consumption decision for consumers. Moreover, I give conditions under
which the derived information signal is robust against additional costless learning
by the consumer.
I consider an infinite horizon discrete time model, where the consumer may con-
sume one unit of a good each period. Consumption induces instantaneous utility,
but gives rise to a negative future externality with unknown probability. For in-
stance, consider food products where the consumption risk of obesity or diabetes are
a priori not transparent. Similarly, smoking, lack of sports, or other unhealthy ac-
tivities feature health risks that may depend on genetic predispositions only testable
by medical experts. The consumer has a strong value for instantaneous gratification
in form of quasi-hyperbolic preferences, which leads to time-inconsistent preferences
(Laibson (1997)).
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) find that in this model there is value of rational
inattention with respect to the risk parameter: Even though information helps a
consumer to achieve a better myopic consumption choice, any information is shared
with future incarnations and may lead to future overconsumption due to the present
bias. Thus, rational inattention may work as a commitment device towards future
incarnations to enable more favorable long-term consumption choices.
I follow the normative approach suggested by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002,
2003) in defining consumer welfare as ex-ante consumer utility before facing con-
sumption decisions.3 As a social planner therefore takes the perspective of the
consumer at time 0, the model can equivalently be regarded as a model of self-
persuasion in which not the regulator but the consumer himself strategically ac-
quires information some time before he faces the consumption decision.
For the analysis of the optimal information signal, I distinguish two cases.
First, I analyze the consumer-optimal signal when the consumer has no access to
further information before making the consumption decisions. As the incentives of a
welfare maximizing planner are aligned with the consumer whenever he does not face
an instantaneous consumption decision, this seems appropriate where information is
not immediately available at reasonable cost. For instance, it seems very implausible
3This approach implies that quasi-hyperbolic discounting is regarded as an “error”.
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that a consumer would first conduct a medical test on his risk type, whenever he
instantaneously faces the opportunity to smoke.
I show that in this case the optimal signal consists of a risk threshold together
with the simple information whether the risk type is above or below the thresh-
old. Similar to Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), this signal improves welfare upon
full information: while under full information the present bias leads to inefficient
consumption of intermediate risk types, this cut-off signal pools (some of) these
intermediate types with high risk types, and induces them to abstention. For many
distributions, the optimal signal can implement first-best welfare.
There are numerous examples where institutions implicitly use cut-off signals in
form of recommendations, guidelines or definitions, when consumers themselves fail
to thoroughly interpret data. Definitions of obesity, limits for responsible drinking,
classification of medical risk groups are only some examples. Moreover, certification
in form of labels—such as the European Union eco label and energy label—are
commonly based on predefined thresholds.
While there may also be other motives for the use of simple information, my
model provides a novel rationale for the use of these tools in regulation. In partic-
ular, it provides an instruction on how such tools may be used to incentivize more
preferable consumption decisions.
As a second case, I assume that consumers can acquire costless additional in-
formation at any time. This assumption seems pertinent in situations where the
consumer can instantaneously access relevant product information online. In the
welfare maximizing Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, the provided ex-ante
information, again, consists of a simple cut-off signal, and consumers don’t acquire
further relevant information. Moreover, I show that under some regularity condi-
tions on the risk distribution, this signal coincides with the optimal signal in case of
full information control by the planner, and consequently achieves the same welfare.
Intuitively, consumers abstain from acquiring more precise information as they fear
that they will eventually end up in the full information equilibrium and overconsume
forever.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I discuss the
related literature. In Section 3, I introduce the model. I start Section 4 with the
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benchmark of full information, before I analyze the case of full information control
by the planner, and the case of costless consumer learning. Section 5 concludes this
paper. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
There is substantial evidence that individuals have dynamically inconsistent time
preferences (Frederick et al. (2002), DellaVigna (2009)). As a common feature,
discount rates increase as the date approaches. The employed (β, δ)-model of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting dates back to Phelps and Pollak (1968), who used it to model
imperfect inter-generational altruism. Laibson (1997) was first to use it in the
context of an intra-personal conflict. It has arguably become the standard model
of time-inconsistent preferences.
The existence of self-control problems and time-inconsistent preferences inher-
ently gives value to devices that enable individuals to commit to future actions.
Many papers have analysed how the market can offer such a device by selling ad-
equate goods such as illiquid assets (Laibson (1998), Diamond and Kőszegi (2003)),
rationed quantities (Wertenbroch (1998)), or long-term memberships (DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2006)).
My paper connects to another strand of the literature where individuals use
belief manipulation as an intrapersonal commitment device. Bénabou and Tirole
(2002) show how endogenously chosen imperfect recall may lead to overconfidence
to overcome motivational problems. Brocas and Carrillo (2000) show how informa-
tion avoidance can be welfare increasing under time-inconsistent preferences. My
paper builds on the dynamic consumption model by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000).
Consumption yields instantaneous utility but with unknown risk some delayed cost.
They show that individuals with time-inconsistent preferences may prefer to abstain
from information acquisition on the risk parameter, even if information is costless.
Consumers, who have the ability to sample information according to a Bernoulli
process, may fear to be trapped in inefficient consumption forever for intermediate
risk estimates. In order to avoid this overconsumption they may stop sampling at
beliefs that induce abstention.
My paper is also closely related to the very recent and independently developed
5
work by Mariotti et al. (2018) who also find cut-off signals as the optimal persua-
sion mechanism in a 4-period model with consumers with self control problems.
While they derive optimal mechanisms for different principal’s objectives (e.g. con-
sumption maximizing lobbyist, consumption minimizing policy maker), my work
focuses on the robustness of the optimal mechanism in an infinite horizon game
with additional learning opportunities.
While Carrillo and Mariotti show that there is value of stopping Bernoulli sam-
pling, I derive the optimal information policy for their consumption model, when
the consumer (or a regulator on behalf of the consumer) is unconstrained in the
ability to design information signals (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)), and derive
precise conditions when the optimal signal induces first-best consumption utility.
My paper also relates to the literature on paternalistic motives. In the con-
text of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) study
the optimal paternalistic tax, when consumption exerts a negative utility on fu-
ture periods. Arguably, the regulation of information is—at least if information is
freely available—a much softer form of paternalism than sin taxes. The provided
information with its implicit consumption recommendation can be interpreted as a
default action, which the consumer may or may not follow. If we think of infor-
mation being available at some very small cost, my model is more in the spirit of
libertarian paternalism, and relates to the example in Thaler and Sunstein (2003),
where the planner of a cafeteria may place dessert in a further location to induce
small transaction costs for its consumption.
Based on the work of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Rayo and Segal
(2010), there has been a quickly evolving literature on Bayesian persuasion and
information design. Yet, very little is known about optimal sequential information
design by conflicting parties. Li and Norman (2017) study sequential persuasion
with multiple senders. Similar to my model, attention can be restricted to equilibria
in which information is only provided in the first period. Terstiege and Wasser
(2017) analyze buyer-otpimal information structures in a monopoly that are robust
to additional information provision by the seller. To my best knowledge, this paper
provides the first dynamic model in which the receiver himself may acquire addition
information before choosing an action.
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3 The Model
The consumption model with intertemporal preferences closely follows Carrillo and
Mariotti (2000). Consider an infinite discrete time model, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ....
In every period t ≥ 1, a risk-neutral consumer decides whether he wants to consume
one unit of an indivisible good. Consumption induces an instantaneous utility
normalized to one. Let therefore xt ∈ {0, 1} denote the consumption choice at time
t.4
Consumption exerts a negative externality on the welfare of future periods. More
precisely, consumption at time t reduces the consumer’s utility in period t+ τ with
probability θ by an amount cτ ∈ [0, c] for all τ ≥ 1. In particular, the magnitude of
the externalities is assumed to be independent of past consumption choices.
The probability θ of a realization of the externality is unknown to the consumer.
It is distributed according to some prior distribution with cdf F0 and continuous,
positive density f0(θ) on support [0, 1].
5 However, at time 0 a regulator on behalf
of the consumer may design an information signal about θ, which the consumer
observes at no cost. In the beginning of any subsequent period the consumer may
acquire further information about θ. Details on the informational process are ex-
plained after the characterization of the intrapersonal conflict.
Intertemporal Payoffs and Intrapersonal Conflict
The instantaneous expected utility ut at each date t consists of the potential con-
sumption utility and the expected externality costs ct−τθ, acquired in former periods
τ ∈ {1, ..., t− 1}, i.e.





To abstract away from updating the value of θ due to the realization of the
externality, I follow Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) in assuming that the consumer
does not observe his current utility.
4As Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) point out, the restriction to binary decisions is without loss of
generality. Indeed, whenever the consumer decides to consume, he wishes to consume the maximal
amount.
5I follow Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) in assuming that the magnitude of the externality is
known to consumers, whereas its probability of occurrence is unknown. It is straightforward
to derive an equivalent model where the externality occurs with certainty, but its magnitude is
unknown.
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As a key assumption, I assume the consumer has present-biased preferences as
developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and employed by Laibson (1996, 1997): The
consumer at time t assigns a discount factor of βδτ (β, δ < 1) to the instantaneous
utility in period t+ τ (τ ≥ 1). Utility from the consumer’s perspective at time t (in
the following called “self-t”) then reads





The parameter β can be regarded as the “impatience” or “impulsiveness” (Ainslie
(1992)). In contrast to classical exponential discounting, this quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting leads to decisions that are time inconsistent: The optimal contingent plan
of self-t for consumption in some future period t+ τ may not longer be optimal to
implement for self-t+τ , as self-t+τ has a strong taste for instantaneous gratification.
Consequently, the collection of different selves of the consumer play a non-
cooperative game against each other. To focus on this intra-personal conflict, I
assume that the consumer has no commitment power towards his future selfs. The
main scope of this paper is to analyze to which extend optimal information pro-
vision in the sense of Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) can
mitigate the time-inconsistency problem and increase consumer’s utility.
Besides his self control problem the consumer behaves fully rational: he perfectly
anticipates his behavior and has perfect recall.
Information Provision and Learning
Consider now the role of a welfare maximizing regulator. Given the conflict be-
tween the desires of different consumer selfs, it is a priori unclear how to define
an appropriate welfare function. I follow the approach suggested by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2002, 2003) and pursued by many others in focusing on the welfare of
self-0. Thus, the regulator takes the perspective of the consumer before he faces
any consumption decision.
Definition 3.1. A signal structure for θ consists of a finite signal space
S = {s1, ..., sn} together with a joint distribution G on the measurable space
([0, 1] × S,B([0, 1] × S)), where B([0, 1] × S) is the induced Borel algebra. Defin-
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ing the joint distribution the usual way by G(θ̃, s̃) = Pr(θ ≤ θ̃, s ≤ s̃), we say S
is consistent with belief F about θ, if for all θ ∈ [0, 1] the marginal distributions
satisfy
G(θ, sn) = F (θ).
At time 0 the regulator may costlessly provide any F0-consistent signal structure
S0 about the risk type θ. Observing a signal realization s, the consumer forms pos-
terior belief F1 according to the conditional distribution G(·|s). We can for example
think of a costless health check which reveals some information about individual
health risk of smoking, or some legal requirements for product labelling, which pro-
vides the consumer with some (incomplete) information about the (un)healthiness
of food products.
In many circumstances it seems plausible that the regulator has exclusive control
over information in the sense that it is too costly for the agent to acquire additional
information himself whenever he faces a consumption decision.6
In other environments the consumer may be able to instantaneously find relevant
information online at (almost) no cost.
In the following analysis, I therefore consider two cases. First, I analyze the
optimal signal structure whenever the regulator (or self-0) has full control over
information. Then, I consider the case where the consumer may acquire additional
information each period before the consumption decision. Formally, at time t ≥ 1
the consumer may design any signal structure St that is consistent with the belief
Ft derived from Bayesian updating in period t− 1.
Whenever we think of the case of full information control by the regulator we
formally restrict consumer’s information acquisition at any time t ≥ 1 to the trivial
signal S = {s}.
Equilibrium Concept
In each period t ≥ 1, a strategy for the consumer consists of a learning decision
in form of a signal St, and the consumption decision xt ∈ {0, 1}, based on the
6As the regulator’s interest is aligned with the consumer whenever the consumer does not face
an instantaneous consumption decision, an alternative interpretation of the model would be that
at time zero—say at home—the consumer himself has costless access to information about his risk
type, whereas in the situation of consumption—say in the supermarket—such information would
be excessively costly as it is not directly available.
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posterior derived from updating with respect to the signal. Since the payoff relevant
information at the beginning period t is captured by belief Ft, and is independent
of time, it is natural to focus on Markov strategies.
Definition 3.2. A Markov strategy for the consumer prescribes for each belief
F an F -consistent signal structure SF , and for each signal realization s ∈ SF a
consumption decision x(F, s) ∈ {0, 1}.
Certainly, as the consumption decision has no impact on future behavior, the
consumer optimally consumes whenever consumption utility exceeds expected ex-
ternality cost, given the updated belief from signal s. Formally, in any equilibrium









Definition 3.3. We say a subgame perfect equilibrium of the prescribed game is
a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), if the consumer’s strategy for t ≥ 1 forms a
Markov strategy. We say a Markov perfect equilibrium is preferred, if it maximizes
self-0’s utility among all Markov perfect equilibria.
The solution concept to the game will be preferred Markov perfect equilibrium
(PMPE). To ensure existence, the following assumption is maintained throughout
the paper.
Assumption 3.4. The consumer breaks any tie in favor of the regulator: Whenever
the consumer at any time is indifferent between preferred signal structures or the
two consumption decision, he takes the decision that maximizes utility of self-0.
We will see that the unique PMPE arises naturally in this context: the regulator
provides information which can be interpreted as a consumption recommendation.
The consumer finds it optimal to follow the consumption recommendation and









be the present value magnitude of the externality without present bias. The follow-
ing condition is assumed to hold for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 4.1. If the consumer knows with certainty that the externality real-
izes he prefers to abstain, i.e.
βC > 1.
The Full Learning Benchmark
In order to understand the benefit of incomplete information, it is insightful to first
analyze benchmark where the consumer has complete information about θ.
From the perspective of self-0, the expected value of consumption at any time
t ≥ 1 is
δt(βxt − βxtCθ),
thus consumption is optimal if and only if θ ≤ 1
C
. However, the value of instanta-
neous consumption for self-t is
xt − xtβCθ.
Consumption therefore is optimal for self-t if and only if θ ≤ 1
βC
. Hence, a conflict





will consume even though his past selves would have liked to commit to abstention.
The loss due to the lack of commitment power is depicted in Figure 3.1.
The dashed line depicts the self-t’s utility from his optimal consumption decision
in period t to consume whenever θ ≤ 1
C
. The solid line represents self-0’s (δt-
undiscounted) utility of self-t’s decision. From the perspective of self-0, the shaded
area illustrates the loss of self-t’s action compared to self-0’s preferred action.


































Figure 1: Welfare loss under complete information









In the following we will see how less information about θ may induce self-t to
consumption choices that are more aligned with the interest of self-0.
Full Information Control
In this section, I analyze the equilibrium, when the regulator has full control over
the information provided to consumers.
Since there is no information acquisition at any t ≥ 1, and we restrict to Markov
strategies, the consumption choices are history-independent and identical at all
times. Consequently, the regulator faces a persuasion problem in the sense of Ka-
menica and Gentzkow (2011). Recall that there is a conflict of interest between




]. In her position
of an information sender, the regulator’s objective is to let the consumer receive
information, which induces him to abstain in the conflicting interval as much as
possible.
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The solution to the regulator’s problem is to use a cut-off strategy. She will
inform the consumer, whether his risk type θ is above or below some threshold y.
Proposition 4.2. If the regulator has full control over information, the welfare
















s1, θ < y,
s2, θ ≥ y.















then y = 1
C















then y is uniquely determined by the condition that E [θ|θ > y] = 1
βC
. Welfare
under S strictly exceeds welfare under full information.
As the consumer abstains if and only if his expected risk θ weakly exceeds 1
βC
,





with high risk types by maintaining an expected risk weakly above 1
βC
. Within
this interval the regulator prefers to induce abstention for the high types for two
reasons: Firstly, for those types consumption creates the highest disutility to self-0.




The optimal signal can be interpreted as an incentive compatible recommenda-
tion by the regulator to the consumer. Given consumer’s risk type, the regulator
recommends whether to consume or abstain, and the consumer wishes to follow the
recommendation. It is therefore consistent with commonly observed health recom-
7The reason why it suffices to have only two signal realizations is very similar to the logic
revelation principle. Whenever different signal realizations lead to the same action, we can instead
use the signal structure, where the consumer cannot distinguish among these, without changing
his optimal action. One can therefore assume without loss of generality that any signal structure
has (at most) as many states as the action space.
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mendations by experts as well as certified product labels which require products to
satisfy legally defined limits on harmful substances.
To better understand the conflict of interest between self-0 and self-t, I derive
the information signal at time 0 that is not preferred by self-0 but by self-t for
t ≥ 1. Again, as all consumer incarnations have the same information, any Markov
strategy prescribes the same consumption decision to all incarnations. The following
Lemma derives the preferred consumption decision of self-t if the decision has to be
the same at all times t.
Lemma 4.3. If all consumers have to take the same consumption decision rule
x(θ) ∈ {0, 1}, then the optimal decision rule from the perspective of self-t for t ≥ 1
is






Recall that the first best consumption choice of self-0 was to consume if and only
if θ ≤ 1
C
, while the optimal myopic decision under full information was to consume
if and only if θ ≤ 1
βC
. The optimal consumption threshold is a weighted average
between these two objectives as it trades off self-t’s instantaneous gain from high
consumption with the loss that all future incarnations will consume equally much.
The higher the long-run discount factor δ the more weight the consumer puts on
the long run utility. The lower δ, the stronger is the consumer’s desire for instant
gratification.
Following the argument of Proposition 4.2 with this objective, one immediately
obtains
Corollary 4.4. If self-t for t ≥ 1 has full control over information provided by



















s1, θ < y,
s2, θ ≥ y.



















then y = δ 1
C
+ (1 − δ) 1
βC



















then y is uniquely determined by the condition that E [θ|θ > y] = 1
βC
. Welfare
under S strictly exceeds welfare under full information.
Costless Learning
I now look at the case, where the consumer may learn additional information cost-
lessly at any time.
I begin the analysis with the observation that the consumer never benefits from
postponing the acquisition of relevant information.
Definition 4.5. Consider a Markov perfect equilibrium. An information signal
SF is relevant, if acquiring SF when the belief is F at any time t induces different
expected utility to self-t or self-0 than acquiring no information.
Lemma 4.6. On equilibrium path in a Markov perfect equilibrium the consumer
will not acquire relevant information signals at any time t > 1.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Any acquired information by
self-t (t ≥ 1) can only help to improve his consumption decision. The only incentive
for self-t to remain nevertheless uninformed about θ is to “discipline” future selfs
to take a more favorable consumption decision. If self-t anticipates that self-t + 1
will acquire additional information anyway, self-t (weakly) prefers to acquire that
information herself.
Note that the regulator and self-1 are indifferent between information provision
in period 0 and information acquisition in period 1. We can therefore in the fol-
lowing restrict without loss of generality to equilibria where (on equilibrium path)
information is solely provided in period 0.
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Since no incarnation wants to know less than his successor, each incarnation will
acquire full information himself whenever the successor would do so. As an immedi-
ate consequence, the time-independent strategy of always acquiring full information
regardless of the current belief forms a Markov perfect equilibrium.8
Corollary 4.7. For any subgame starting at any time t ≥ 0 the Markov strategy of

















for all beliefs F constitutes a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Besides the full information equilibrium, there may be a plethora of other po-
tential equilibria. In the following, I am looking for the regulator-preferred Markov
perfect equilibrium, and argue that it arises natural the context of our model.
The ability to support information provision by the regulator without further
learning as an equilibrium depends on the ability to punish deviations to this infor-
mation policy by future incarnations. Since any punishment has to be sequentially
rational, it turns out that the maximum punishment to deviations from the equi-
librium path is given by the full information subgame.
Lemma 4.8. For any t ≥ 0, the Markov perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting
time t + 1 which minimizes the utility of self-t is given by the full information
equilibrium, where each self-s for s ≥ t+1 for every belief chooses a full information
signal.
The equilibrium in Proposition 4.2 where the regulator has full control over
information can be sustained with costless consumer learning if the one time gain
from acquiring a preferable information structure does not exceed the loss from
being stuck in the full information equilibrium afterwards. Proposition 4.9 gives
precise conditions when this is the case.
8Formally, full information cannot be attained, since the state space is continuous, whereas
we restrict the signal space to be finite. However, since the action space is only binary, the
full information outcome can be replication with a binary signal (see Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011)). Indeed, take the cut-off signal that displays s1 if and only if θ ≤
1
βC
. This signal induces
the consumer to make the full information consumption choice to consume whenever θ > 1
βC
— independently of further information realization. In the following, whenever I refer to a full
information signal, one may think of this signal.
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Proposition 4.9. 1. There is a preferred Markov perfect equilibrium with cost-
less learning in which the only learning takes place at t = 0. The regulator









s1, θ < y,
s2, θ ≥ y.
The consumer always consumes if S = s1 and always abstains if S = s2.
2. The cut-off y and the consumption decisions coincide with those in Proposition
4.2, where the regulator has full control over information, if and only if the








































Welfare is strictly higher than under full information and strictly higher than
in the case of Corollary 4.4, where the consumer at time t = 1 chooses the
signal structure.
The intuition for the threshold y is depicted in Figure 3.2.
On equilibrium path, the consumer does not exert learning at any t, and con-
sumes according to signal S whenever θ < y. If some consumer incarnation deviates
and acquires additional information at some time t then all subsequent selfs s > t
will acquire full information, and accordingly consume whenever θ < 1
βC
. The
solid line represents the (δ-undiscounted) per period utility of self-t from such a
consumption choice in all periods s > t. Compared to abstention for θ > y on
equilibrium path, self-t obtains each period s > t a discounted loss proportional to
the light grey shaded area. He will find this deviation profitable only if the sum of
these discounted losses are exceeded by the one time gain of the deviation in period
t. The most profitable deviation is full information, as it allows the best informed
consumption choice. The dashed line depicts self-t’s utility from full information in
period t. The one time gain for self-t compared to the utility on equilibrium path
17
Figure 2: Gain and Loss of a Deviation from Self-t’s Perspective
is depicted by the dark grey shaded area, where self-t consumes whenever θ < 1
βC
.
While there are many other Markov perfect equilibria for the regulator’s signal
in period 0 (including the full information equilibrium), the described equilibrium is
not only welfare maximizing, but also arises naturally in this context. The informa-
tion signal in period 0 can be regarded as an incentive compatible recommendation
of a default option by the regulator: All consumer incarnations find it optimal to
take the information as given and base their consumption decision on the implied
recommendation.9
Next, we look at sufficient conditions for the distribution to satisfy condition 1
for the optimal cut-off y, so that the outcome under full information control and in
the PMPE under costless learning coincide.
Recall from Proposition 4.2 that the optimal threshold y under full information




]. Consequently, E[θ|θ ∈ [y, 1
βC









] has most of its











9In this sense, by the choice of the information signal, the social planner coordinates consumers
on one chosen equilibrium, as it is common in the mechanism design literature.
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]. Note that the





which the density must not decrease too fast. The following Corollary puts a bound
on δ for priors that are nondecreasing in this range, which includes the natural
benchmark of a uniform prior.




], and δ ≥ 12 , then Condi-
tion 1 in Proposition 4.9 is satisfied and the PMPE with costless learning coincides
with the equilibrium with full informational control as described in Proposition 4.2.
As one can interpret δ as the discount due to a common market interest rate
between two consumption decisions, this condition is easily satisfied.
More generally, a sufficiently high δ always relaxes Condition 1, made precise in
the following Corollary.10
Corollary 4.11. For any prior distribution there exists a δ < 1 such that for all
δ ∈ [δ, 1] Condition 1 in Proposition 4.9 is satisfied and the PMPE with costless
learning coincides with the equilibrium with full informational control as described
in Proposition 4.2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I showed how a paternalistic social planner can use information design
to persuade consumers with quasi-hyperbolic preferences to better consumption
decisions. The optimal information signal takes the remarkably simple form of
a cut-off signal, which can be easily implemented by the use of threshold-based
recommendations or certified labels.
The results provide intuitive benchmarks for the novel perspective of using in-
formation design as a paternalistic policy.
The are several natural ways to extend this baseline model, including informa-
tion cost for information acquisition, consumer näıveté about their present bias, or
consumer heterogeneity in the degree of present bias.
Altogether, this chapter may be regarded as a starting point for interesting
future research.
10Note that this is not immediate as the value of the externality C depends on δ.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let S be the signal structure chosen by the regulator, let
G(θ, s) be its joint distribution on [0, 1] × S. Since the consumer has no access
to further information at t ≥ 1, a strategy for the consumer consists of a sequen-
tially rational consumption decision x(s) ∈ {0, 1} for all signal realizations s ∈ S.









1, βCE[θ|s] < 1,
0, βCE[θ|s] ≥ 1.
The regulator’s problem is to find an F0-consistent signal structure (S,G) which






x(s)(1− Cθ)dG(θ, s). (2)
This problem is a classical persuasion problem as defined in Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) with continuous state space [0, 1]. In Proposition 3 of their Web
Appendix they show that an optimal signal exists for such persuasion problems.
Further, according to their Proposition 1, we can restrict to information signals
S = {s1, s2}, where realization s1 induces consumption, while realization s2 induces
abstention. Let from now S = {s1, s2} with distribution G(θ, s) be an optimal F0-
consistent signal structure.




) such that the
realization is s1 if and only if θ < y. Suppose this is not the case. Due to the
strictly positive density of the prior distribution, there exists by the intermediate
value theorem some unique y ∈ [0, 1] such that P(S = s2) = P(θ > y). We show
that the cut-off signal which displays s1 if and only if θ ≤ y improves upon S.
Since
P(S = s2, θ ≤ y) = P(S = s2)− P(S = s2, θ > y)
= P(S = s2)−
(
P(θ > y)− P(S = s1, θ > y)
)
= P(S = s1, θ > y),
20
we have
























P(θ ≤ y, S = s2)y +
∫
θ>y,s∈S














= E[θ|θ > y].
Consequently, the consumer abstains for θ > y under the cut-off signal, whenever
he abstains for S = s2 under signal S. Analogously, one can show that since
E[θ|S = s1] > E[θ|θ ≤ y], the consumer consumes for θ ≤ y under the cut-off signal
whenever he consumes for S = s1 under signal S. Plugging this decision rule into
the regulator’s objective (2), and using E[θ|S = s1] > E[θ|θ ≤ y], we see that the
































exceeds her utility under S.
We have shown that the optimal signal is a cut-off signal. To determine the






























the constraint is not binding and we get
the boundary solution y = 1
C
. Otherwise the constraint binds, thus
E[θ|θ > y] = 1
βC
. Finally, since the optimal signal induces abstention on [y, 1] with
y < 1
βC
whereas full information induces abstention on 1
βC
, self-0’s utility under
the optimal cut-off signal strictly exceeds his utility under full information.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Utility of self-t from consumption with risk type θ is
Ut(θ) = (1− βCθ) + βδ(1− Cθ) + βδ





















thus if and only if







Proof of Corollary 4.4. The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 4.2, where

















In particular, the optimal signal is a cut-off signal, which aims to induce the most




as calculated in Lemma 4.3.























and the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. We start by defining the collapse of two signal structures.
Let S be an F -consistent signal structure with distribution G. For some signal
realization sk ∈ S let F̃ = G(·|sk) be the posterior distribution. Further, let S̃ be
an F̃ -consistent signal structure with distribution G̃. The collapse of S and S̃ is
the signal structure with signal space S = (S\{sk}) ⊔ S̃ and a joint distribution on
([0, 1]× S,B([0, 1]× S)) defined via








PG(θ ≤ θ̂, s = ŝ), ŝ ∈ S\{sk},
PG(s = sk)PG̃(θ ≤ θ̂, s = ŝ), ŝ ∈ S̃.
Note that acquiring first S and then S̃ whenever the signal realization is s̃ is equiv-
alent to acquiring the collapsed signal of S and S̃.
Consider now a Markov perfect equilibrium and denote for the consumer’s
Markov strategy with SF the signal choice for belief F . (If the consumer decides
not to learn for belief F , take SF as the trivial signal consisting of only one state.)
Let t > 1. Since in equilibrium self-t with belief Ft acquires SFt , this implies
that the consumer weakly prefers the distribution of posteriors from SFt to belief Ft.
However, since self-t− 1 acquires SFt−1 rather than the collapse of SFt−1 with SFt
implies that the consumer weakly prefers belief Ft to the distribution of posteriors
from SFt . It follows that the consumer is indifferent between belief Ft and the
distribution of posteriors from SFt .
Consequently, self-t − 1 with belief Ft−1 is indifferent between acquiring SFt−1
and acquiring the collapse of SFt−1 with SFt , whereas self-t is indifferent between
acquiring SFt and the trivial signal.
Suppose now SFt is relevant for t > 1. As self-t is indifferent between SFt
and the trivial signal, this implies that self-0 is not. Since by Assumption 3.4
self-t always chooses self-0’s preferred action whenever he is indifferent between his
preferred action, self-0 strictly prefers self-t to acquire signal SFt rather than the
trivial signal. This implies he prefers future incarnations to have the distribution
of posteriors from SFt rather than belief Ft. In particular, self-0 prefers self-t − 1
to acquire the collapse of SFt−1 with SFt rather than his equilibrium choice SFt−1 .
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Since self-t− 1 is indifferent between the two, but chooses SFt−1 , Assumption 3.4 is
violated, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4.8. By Corollary 4.7, the full information strategy for the sub-
game starting at t + 1 is a Markov perfect equilibrium. Take any other Markov
perfect equilibrium of the subgame. Lemma 4.6 states that for the game starting
at t = 1 with belief F1 there is only information acquisition at t = 1 in equilibrium.
By renaming the time index it is immediate that for any subgame starting at t+ 1
with belief Ft+1 there is only information acquisition at time t + 1 in equilibrium.
Consequently, the consumption decision is identical at all times starting at t + 1.
Let SFt+1 with distribution G be the information signal at t + 1 and x(s) be the
consumption decision for signal realization s. Then the expected utility for self-t+1





whereas the undiscounted per-period utility for self-t + 1 generated by all future















the respective expected per-period utilities from full information for self-t+ 1 with
belief Ft+1. Since the equilibrium strategy must give at least the same utility as
deviating to full information and consuming the full information consumption level
forever, we have
vt+1 + β(δv + δ
2v + ...) ≥ vFIt+1 + β(δv
FI + δ2vFI + ...).
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Since full information enables self-t + 1 to his best consumption choice we have
vFIt+1 ≥ vt+1 and therefore
β(δv + δ2v + ...) ≥ β(δvFI + δ2vFI + ...).
Now, on the left-hand side we have the utility for self-t generated by the equilibrium,
whereas on the right-hand side we have the utility for self-t generated by the full
information equilibrium, which shows that no equilibrium for the subgame starting
at t+ 1 can induce a lower utility to self-t than the full information equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4.9. By Lemma 4.6 we can restrict to Markov equilibria with
no information acquisition on equilibrium path at any time t ≥ 1. Such an equilib-
rium induces the same consumption decisions for all incarnations of the consumer.
A necessary condition for a Markov strategy to be part of such a Markov perfect
equilibrium different to the full information equilibrium is that self-1 does not benefit





























Note that U depends on the updated belief F1, thus on the information realization
in t = 0.
Hence, a solution to the relaxed problem, where the regulator maximizes her
utility under the constraint that self-1’s utility without further information acqui-
sition weakly exceeds U for all realizations of the regulator’s signal, puts an upper
bound on the utility which the regulator can achieve in any Markov perfect equilib-
rium. We determine this upper bound and show how to implement it as a Markov
perfect equilibrium.
First, note that for a solution to the relaxed problem we can again restrict at-
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tention to signals in SF0 = {s1, s2} where realization s1 induces consumption and
s2 induces abstention. Indeed, if self-1 does not benefit from full information for
any signal realization of a signal S = {s1, ..., sn}, then he does not benefit from full
information in expectation for all states that induce consumption or abstention.
Consequently, combining all realizations that induce consumption and all that in-
duce abstention into one each yields a signal with two states for which self-1 does
not benefit from full information.
Next, we show that a solution to the relaxed problem exists, if and only if it exists
in the class of cut-off signals. Let S be a non-cutoff signal and let again y ∈ [0, 1] be
such that P(S = s2) = P(θ > y). We showed in the proof of Proposition 4.2 that the
cut-off signal which displays s1 if and only if θ ≤ y improves the regulator’s utility
compared to S and does not change consumer’s consumption decision. Moreover
this cut-off signal improves self-1’s utility: The cut-off signal changes the consumer’s
action from abstention to consumption whenever S = s2 and θ ≤ y. It changes the
consumer’s action from consumption to abstention whenever S = s1 and θ > y.
Since
P(S = s2, θ ≤ y) = P(S = s2)− P(S = s2, θ > y)
= P(S = s2)−
(
P(θ > y)− P(S = s1, θ > y)
)
= P(S = s1, θ > y),
the same share of consumers consume under S and under the cut-off signal. Hence
consumption utility is the same, however as lower risk types consume, the expected
externality cost is lower. Consequently, self-1 finds it suboptimal to deviate to full
information under the cut-off signal, whenever he finds it suboptimal under the
signal S. This concludes the argument that for a solution to the relaxed problem
we can focus on cut-off signal.
Before we determine the optimal cut-off as the solution to the relaxed problem,
we show how such a cut-off signal in t = 0 can be implemented as a Markov
Perfect equilibrium, in which no consumer acquires information at t > 0. Call Fθ>y
and Fθ<y the posterior distributions from the cut-off signal, i.e. the two possible
beliefs at t = 1. Consider the Markov strategy where the consumer acquires full
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information whenever he has a belief inconsistent with the regulator’s signal, and

































F /∈ {Fθ>y, Fθ<y},
{s}, F ∈ {Fθ>y, Fθ<y}.
Together with the sequentially optimal consumption decisions (consume when-
ever the belief is Fθ<y or Fθ< 1
βC
) this is indeed a Markov perfect equilibrium:
Whenever the belief is not Fθ>y or Fθ<y, each self-t anticipates that the next in-
carnation will acquire full information, so he finds it optimal to do so himself, as
full information allows the best myopic consumption choice. Whenever the belief
is Fθ>y or Fθ<y, any information acquisition would end up in a different posterior
and would induce full information next period. As the best myopic deviation would
be full information, such a deviation would generate at most a utility of U , and is
therefore by assumption not improving upon the trivial signal.
Having established that the PMPE consists of a cut-off signal from the regulator
and no consumer information acquisition on equilibrium path we now calculate the
optimal cut-off y.
Consider a cut-off signal with cut-off y which induces abstention for θ > y, i.e.
E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1
βC
. Such a signal induces a Markov perfect equilibrium for the above
Markov strategy if and only if no consumer incarnation benefits from deviating to





























(1− θC)dF0(θ) ≤ 0.

































































E[θ|θ > y] ≥
1
βC



























our optimal cut-off coincides with the cut-off in the case where the consumer






















then the constraint E[θ|θ > y] ≥ 1
βC
for the optimal cut-off is not binding. The







































the minimum is not at the boundary 1
C



















where the right hand side is by Corollary 4.4 the self-1 preferred cut-off. Thus,




] than under the self-1 preferred signal from Corollary
4.4 and induces higher welfare.
Proof of Corollary 4.11. By assumption, the prior has a continuous and strictly
positive density f0, thus attains its minimum f
min
0 and its maximum f
max






















































































Since y ≥ 1
C





























], then the condi-




] first order stochastically dominates the
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